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Professor Mifsud's paper is a valuable contribution to efforts aimed at
elaborating the moral dimensions of rhetoric, defending the field against the
charge that it lacks a commitment to substantive values, a charge as old as the
discipline itself. The concept of the "wedge," i.e. the opening up of new
choices and thereby of greater freedom for the audience, usefully points to
what is indeed often a characteristic of "genuine" or "good" (as distinguished
from "mere" or "bad") rhetoric. The idea of the "bridge" that Professor Mifsud
elaborates further in this paper is an appropriate complementary concept,
pointing back to the concerns of the speaker. I think it is important to keep in
mind that rhetoric is significantly influenced by the purposes of rhetors. Any
profession of a completely selfless concern for the audience, which might be
implied by a too exclusive focus on the "wedge," would more likely be cause
for growing suspicion rather than providing effective reassurance about the
moral core of rhetoric.
So on the whole I think this is a well-conceived project, but I also think that there
may still be some room for clarification. I will organize my remarks around five
of the concepts that figure prominently in Professor Mifsud's paper:
1. Wedge
One question I would raise about the "wedge" is this: does it have to be
opened explicitly or intentionally in order to make the rhetoric opening it
"genuine"? Professor Mifsud uses radically biased political utterances, pep
rallies, and partisan political gatherings as instances of wedgeless rhetoric.
But can such statements and events not sometimes open up wedges anyway?
Let us think of examples such as hate speech that is used ironically, or that is
so repulsive that it inadvertently opens up new choices for its audience. Should
the intent be decisive? But then what if an intended irony is not perceived by
the audience, or what if wedging is not intended but overwhelmingly effected
anyway? The relative importance of intent, content and effect in determining
whether a certain instance of rhetoric is indeed "wedging" deserves further
thought.
Furthermore, are the examples of "spectator rhetoric" adduced by Professor
Mifsud really completely wedgeless performances? I think it could be argued
that for instance Gorgias' "Encomium of Helen," as well as "The Encomium of
Baldness," and "The Eulogy of the Gnat" playfully suggested to their audiences
that they could or should reinterpret the merits of Helen, baldness, or gnats,
and perhaps also of rhetoric; and that by further implication things widely
viewed with disfavor might not always fully deserve that general disdain. And
could not Bill Clinton's 1999 state of the union address suggest to members of
its audience new interpretations of Bill Clinton (whether intended or not) that
might not have occurred to them without listening to this speech in this
situation?
2. Interpretation
Should interpretation be regarded as the genus of rhetoric, or as a species of
rhetoric? Professor Mifsud states that "interpretation is not a species of
rhetoric. Indeed, it will turn out that the converse is true." But I am not sure that
the paper provides an effective argument in support of that assertion. If rhetoric
is a species of interpretation, then there would have to be non-rhetorical
interpretations, and that appears to me quite doubtful, since all interpretations
are meant to persuade an audience to view something in a certain way.
Professor Mifsud points to gun-supported threats and thunderbolts in the night
as non-rhetorical events eliciting interpretation; but the fact that events eliciting
interpretations are non-rhetorical does not show that the interpretations
themselves are non-rhetorical. The interpretations in these cases are carried
out by those who observe these non-rhetorical phenomena and persuade
themselves to act (or not act) in certain ways on the basis of these
interpretations: the observers engage in "reflexive rhetoric." A threat
interpreted as not serious may be ignored, a thunderbolt interpreted as an
omen may be heeded, etc. Such interpretations are not strictly "caused" by the
events themselves, since alternative interpretations are indeed possible in
every case.
3. Bilaterality
To what extent is bilaterality really required for "genuine" rhetoric? It is of
course always possible to respond to a rhetorical performance, but bilaterality
seems to imply that the performance invites such responses to the rhetor. But
many theatrical, film, or television performances may be quite enlightening and
choice-opening for those watching them, and yet not invite audience
participation or response to those creating these events. And should we
classify attorneys' speeches to juries or Supreme Court opinions as "mere"
rhetoric, simply because they do not invite a reasoned response from their
addressees, do not give their immediate audiences "the same freedom to use
communicative strategies in addressing the rhetor as the rhetor does in
addressing the audience?"
4. Identification
In this paper, the term "identification" is used to characterize the mode of
operation of wedgeless "bacchanalian" rhetoric, as differentiated from the
power of distinction inherent in the rhetorical wedge. Identification is said to
operate through bypassing rather than overcoming different perspectives,
moving the psyche by a power more akin to compulsion than to judgment. But
the Burkean use of the term "identification" as a near-substitute for
"persuasion" would seem to indicate broader implications, not limiting
identification to wedgeless rhetoric. Since Kenneth Burke's concept of
identification is fairly widely attended to, it may be well to take into account this
larger meaning. In fact, Professor Mifsud herself acknowledges later in her
paper that a form of identification also operates in the "rhetorical bridge," so
there appears to be a "genuine" as well as a "mere" identification here.
5. Persuasion
A widely used brief definition identifies rhetoric as the "art of persuasion," but
Professor Mifsud asks "whether rhetoric's association with persuasion keeps it
shrouded in suspicion," and she undertakes some efforts to dissociate rhetoric
from persuasion. To that end, she posits that rhetoric is concerned with
decision rather than persuasion, judgment rather than persuasion, bilaterality
rather than persuasion. Such dichotomies tend to move the term "persuasion"
ever closer to "manipulation," while I think that there is as yet no general
perception that the two are indistinct. Since the association of rhetoric with
persuasion is based on a very long and strong tradition, I am not sure that it
would be productive to jettison the term.
It is of course true that rhetoric does not aim at persuasion for its own sake, but
that does not imply that persuasion is not a step along the way towards
decisions and judgments; the rhetor studies the available means of persuasion
in order to be able to use them in the quest for good decisions and judgments,
which are to be prepared and prompted by the appropriate deployment of
these means of persuasion. Nor are bilaterality and persuasion mutually
exclusive, as long as mutual persuasion and adaptation between speakers
and audiences rather than one-sided manipulation is the order of the day.
6. Wedge
In conclusion, I return to the wedge, but from a somewhat different perspective.
By treating the wedge as a chief characteristic of "genuine" rhetoric, Professor
Mifsud at least implies that wedging is always a sign of "good" rhetoric, and I
think that may be doubted. There may be unquestioned beliefs that would
better stay unquestioned; would we applaud the wedging that made slavery or
racist killings thinkable? How can a wedge that opens up "bad" choices be an
indicator of genuine rhetoric? I know that concepts such as the rhetorical
wedge and bridge are designed to provide moral content to rhetoric beyond
the traditional focus on the purposes of the speaker or the effects of the
speech. But I don't think that we can entirely dissociate the evaluation of
rhetoric from such concerns. It is one of the insights of rhetoric that moral
evaluations are affected by circumstances, and the evaluation of rhetoric is no
exception.
 
